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1305 
IS NEW YORK ACHIEVING MORE RELIABLE AND JUST 
CONVICTIONS WHEN THE ADMISSIBILITY OF A 
SUGGESTIVE PRETRIAL IDENTIFICATION IS AT ISSUE? 
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK 
People v. Delamota1 
(decided November 17, 2011) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In People v. Delamota, the New York Court of Appeals held a 
pretrial photo array was unduly suggestive and therefore in violation 
of the defendant’s due process rights.2  The court held that the photo 
array was suggestive because the civilian interpreter used during the 
identification knew the defendant prior to the pretrial photo array and 
influenced the victim’s identification.3  The civilian interpreter used 
was the victim’s son, and it only became clear that the victim’s son 
knew the defendant during his testimony at trial.4  The court granted a 
new trial because it found that the suggestiveness of the identification 
procedure was the result of the detective’s decision to use the vic-
tim’s son as the interpreter.5  The court also held that, before the new 
trial, the People may attempt to show that the victim had an inde-
pendent source for his in-court identification;6 this would allow for a 
valid conviction of the defendant even withstanding the suppression 
of the suggestive pretrial identification.7 
This Note will address the federal and New York State ap-
proaches to the issue of suggestive pretrial photo identifications, and 
analyze which approach results in more reliable and just convictions.  
 
1 960 N.E.2d 383 (N.Y. 2011). 
2 Id. at 391. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 386. 
5 Id. at 391. 
6 Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 391. 
7 Id. 
1
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For the most part, New York State has followed federal precedent on 
this issue except for a minor deviation by the New York Court of 
Appeals which may make convictions more just.8  Under the New 
York approach, if an identification procedure is deemed suggestive, 
then the pretrial identification is not admissible at trial.9  This is the 
deviation from federal precedent that is argued to create a more just 
result.10  The federal approach allows for both the admission of the 
pretrial identification—and subsequent in-court identifications—after 
a reliability inquiry to determine whether the witness’ identification 
was influenced by the alleged suggestive procedure employed by law 
enforcement.11  Although the New York approach allows for subse-
quent in-court identifications by a witness if the witness has a basis 
for the identification independent of the suggestive procedure,12 this 
relatively low standard makes the deviation from the federal ap-
proach insignificant and possibly more detrimental to the pursuit of 
just convictions.13 
II. THE OPINION 
This case involved a late night robbery that occurred in Octo-
ber of 2006.14  The victim, Juan Hernandez, was robbed at knifepoint 
in an elevator in his apartment building.15  The victim’s son, Juan Jr., 
placed the 911 call shortly after the robbery because his father did not 
 
8 Compare Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977) (holding that evidence derived 
from a suggestive pretrial identification is admissible at trial when the identification is found 
to be reliable under the totality of the circumstances), with People v. Adams, 423 N.E.2d 
379, 383-84 (N.Y. 1981) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the New York State consti-
tution requires a per se rule of exclusion that renders any pretrial identification evidence de-
rived from that suggestive procedure inadmissible at trial). 
9 Id. at 383-84. 
10 See Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 383-84 (“Permitting the prosecutor to introduce evidence of a 
suggestive pretrial identification can only increase the risks of convicting the innocent in 
cases where it has the desired effect of contributing to a conviction.”). 
11 See Manson, 432 U.S. at 114 (“[R]eliability is the linchpin in determining the admissi-
bility of identification testimony.”). 
12 People v. Chipp, 552 N.E.2d 608, 613 (N.Y. 1990). 
13 See People v. Young, 850 N.E.2d 623, 625 (N.Y. 2006) (holding that the witness had a 
basis independent from the suggestive pretrial identification procedure when the witness tes-
tified that although the perpetrator wore a mask during the crime, she retained a mental im-
age of the defendant’s eyes). 
14 Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 385. 
15 Id. 
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speak English.16  When Detective Koch arrived later that night to in-
terview Hernandez, Juan Jr. was used as an interpreter.17 
Hernandez described the perpetrator to Detective Koch with 
the aid of his son.18  Detective Koch then assembled several photo-
graphs of individuals who matched the description of the perpetrator 
and showed them to Hernandez.19  Hernandez did not identify any of 
the individuals in the photographs as his attacker, and the defendant 
was not one of the individuals portrayed.20  After the robbery, Her-
nandez told his therapist that he recognized the man who robbed 
him.21 
A few days later, Detective Koch met with Hernandez and his 
son again.22  It was at this meeting where Juan Jr. told Detective 
Koch that based on neighborhood gossip, a man named Sebastian 
was his father’s attacker, and Sebastian had been shot on Elmhurst 
Avenue earlier in 2006.23  Detective Koch asked Juan Jr. if he knew 
Sebastian, and he replied that he did not.24  Detective Koch located 
the defendant’s photo based on Juan Jr.’s tip, and he assembled a 
photo array.25  Again, with Juan Jr. acting as an interpreter, Detective 
Koch showed the array to Hernandez.26  This time, Hernandez chose 
the defendant’s photo out of the array.27  The defendant was arrested 
and put in a line-up at the precinct.28  Now, with a Spanish-speaking 
detective serving as an interpreter, Hernandez identified the defend-
ant as his attacker.29 
After the defendant was indicted, his defense counsel moved 
to have the identification evidence suppressed because of the possi-
bility that Juan Jr. knew the defendant prior to the identification pro-
 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 385. 
18 Id. 
19 Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 385. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 386. 
22 Id. at 385. 
23 Id. 
24 Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 385. 
25 Id. at 386. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 386. 
28 Id. 
29 Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 386. 
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cedure while he served as the interpreter.30  The New York Supreme 
Court denied the motion, holding that because Juan Jr. admitted to 
Detective Koch that he did not know the defendant, the photo array 
and subsequent line-up were not suggestive.31  However, the court 
did note that the use of Juan Jr. as an interpreter was “not the best 
practice.”32 
At trial, Juan Jr. admitted that he knew the defendant for “[a] 
long time” prior to the photo array.33  Defense counsel moved to reo-
pen the Wade hearing34 but the court denied the motion, ruling that 
the suppression court would have reached the same conclusion if it 
knew that Juan Jr. was familiar with the defendant before the pretrial 
identification.35  At the conclusion of the People’s case, the defense 
counsel once again moved to dismiss the charges, this time based on 
insufficient evidence and “numerous discrepancies in the [victim’s] 
testimony.”36  The court denied the motion and the defendant was 
convicted of “first-degree robbery, third-degree weapon possession, 
and second-degree menacing.”37 
On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court abused 
its discretion when it refused to reopen the Wade hearing.38  The de-
fendant also argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove guilt 





33 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) 
34 See, e.g. 32A N.Y. Jur. 2d Criminal Law: Procedure § 1624 (“A Wade hearing is a par-
ticular type of suppression hearing, the purpose of which is to test identification testimony 
for taint arising from official suggestion during police-arranged confrontations between a 
defendant and an eyewitness.  When the People serve statutory notice on a defendant that 
they intend to introduce out-of-court identification testimony at trial, the defendant may 
choose to respond with a motion to suppress that testimony and, so long as the motion alleg-
es undue suggestiveness, the defendant is generally entitled to a Wade hearing.”). 
35 Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 386. 
36 Id.  Hernandez first described his attacker “as a Hispanic man in his mid-20[’s] who 
weighed approximately 140 pounds and was about the detective’s height—five feet, six 
inches.  Hernandez also allegedly stated that the perpetrator held the knife in his right hand 
and took the stolen items with his left hand.”  Id. at 385.  Delamota turned out to be signifi-
cantly taller and did not have the ability to use both arms because of a gunshot injury.  Id. 
37 Id. at 386. 
38 Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 386. 
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the sole witness’ pretrial statements and his testimony in court.39  
However, the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and the conviction was 
not against the weight of the evidence.40  The defendant was granted 
leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, and he raised the same issues 
as in his first appeal.41 
The court first addressed the defendant’s claim relating to in-
consistencies between the victim’s first statement to the police and 
his testimony at trial.42  The court dismissed this claim because the 
standard of review applicable to this particular claim did not warrant 
a reversal of the conclusion reached by the Appellate Division.43 
The court then proceeded to address the defendant’s second 
claim regarding the issue of whether the pretrial identification by 
photo array was unduly suggestive when the detective was aware of 
the possibility that the civilian interpreter knew the defendant prior to 
the identification procedure.44  Ultimately, the Court of Appeals 
found the identification procedure to be suggestive because the civil-
ian interpreter could have influenced the victim’s identification of the 
defendant.45  The People argued that the pretrial identification evi-
dence should not be suppressed because Juan Jr., a civilian interpret-
er, was solely responsible for the suggestive aspect of the proce-
dure.46  The court rejected this argument when it ruled that the 
suggestiveness of this procedure is attributed to law enforcement be-
cause the detective chose to use Juan Jr. as an interpreter even though 
the detective was aware of the risk that Juan Jr. knew the defendant.47  
The court ordered a new trial to be preceded by an independent 
source hearing.48  If the People could show by clear and convincing 
 
39 Id. at 387. 
40 Id. at 386-87. 
41 Id. at 387. 
42 Id. 
43 Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 390. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 390-91. 
46 Id. at 390.  See also People v. Marte, 912 N.E.2d 37, 38 (N.Y. 2009) (holding that sug-
gestiveness attributed solely to a civilian does not violate a defendant’s due process rights 
under the New York and Federal Constitutions). 
47 Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 391. 
48 Id. 
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evidence that the victim had a basis for his in-court identification in-
dependent of the suggestive pretrial identification, then the original 
conviction would be valid.49 
III. THE FEDERAL APPROACH 
The issue of pretrial identifications was first addressed by the 
Supreme Court in United States v. Wade.50  Wade involved a defend-
ant who was subjected to a post-indictment line-up without the assis-
tance of counsel.51  The Court held that pretrial identifications require 
the assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment in order to be 
admissible at trial.52  The Court established this rule because it recog-
nized the great potential for undue influence and “prejudice” that may 
occur during a pretrial identification.53  The Court acknowledged that 
the only way to remedy any “prejudice” is to require the presence of 
counsel because counsel might prevent any unfair identification prac-
tices from occurring.54  The Court also established the rule that an in-
court identification following a pretrial identification made without 
the presence of counsel will only be admissible if the prosecution can 
establish by clear and convincing evidence that the witness had an 
independent source for his identification.55  The Court held that the 
factors used to decide the issue of independent source includes the 
opportunity to observe the crime, the accuracy of the description giv-
en by the witness, and the length of time between the crime and the 
identification.56 
The Supreme Court first held that an unduly suggestive pre-
trial identification procedure may deny the defendant due process of 
 
49 Id.  See also Young, 859 N.E.2d at 625 (holding that the witness had a basis independ-
ent from the suggestive pretrial identification procedure when the witness testified that alt-
hough the perpetrator wore a mask during the crime, she retained a mental image of the de-
fendant’s eyes). 
50 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
51 Id. at 220. 
52 Id. at 236-37.  But see United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973) (holding that the 
right to counsel does not extend to pretrial photo identifications because the defendant is not 
present during the identification). 
53 Wade, 388 U.S. at 236. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 240. 
56 Id. at 241. 
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law in Stovall v. Denno.57  In Stovall, the defendant was accused of 
stabbing a doctor to death, as well as the stabbing of the doctor’s 
wife, Mrs. Behrendt, though she survived to be a witness.58  The po-
lice arrested the defendant, and they conducted a show-up identifica-
tion in Mrs. Behrendt’s hospital room while the defendant was hand-
cuffed to an officer.59  The defendant did not have an attorney at this 
point.60  The defendant was identified by Mrs. Behrendt after officers 
asked her if this “was the man.”61  Mrs. Behrendt also made an in-
court identification of the defendant later at trial.62  The defendant 
was convicted and sentenced to death.63 
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and 
the defendant sought habeas corpus relief in the District Court for the 
Southern District of New York.64  He argued that his Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because he was brought 
to the hospital room identification without counsel present and the at-
tention of the witness was unfairly focused on him when he was the 
only person in the room handcuffed to an officer.65  The District 
Court dismissed the petition and, on appeal, the Second Circuit up-
held the dismissal.66 
The Supreme Court refused to apply the holding in Wade ret-
roactively to the case, but it did contend the defendant’s argument 
that the pretrial identification procedure was “so unnecessarily sug-
gestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that he 
was denied due process of law.”67  The Court held that the proper test 
to be applied to the issue of whether admission of pretrial identifica-
tion evidence violates a defendant’s due process rights is a totality of 
the circumstances approach.68  The Court held that in this case the ex-
 
57 388 U.S. 293 (1967). 




62 Stovall, 388 U.S. at 295. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 296. 
66 Id. 
67 Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302. 
68 Id. 
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igent circumstances dictated that the hospital room identification was 
the only method of obtaining a proper identification.69  Mrs. Behrendt 
was the only witness, and she was badly injured.70  There was no cer-
tainty as to if or when she would recover to make a proper identifica-
tion in line-up at the police station.71  Thus, the defendant’s due pro-
cess rights were not violated because, under the totality of the 
circumstances, the hospital room identification procedure was war-
ranted because of the exigent circumstances which surrounded this 
particular identification.72 
The Court specifically addressed the issue of unduly sugges-
tive photo arrays in Simmons v. United States.73  The Court held that 
convictions based on witness “identification[s] at trial following pre-
trial identification by photograph will be set aside on that ground on-
ly if the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly 
suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irrepara-
ble misidentification.”74  The Court also held that these types of 
claims are judged by the totality of the circumstances and on the facts 
of each particular case.75 
Simmons involved a photographic identification of three men 
who were arrested as suspects for a bank robbery.76  The robbery was 
committed in broad daylight by two men, and neither of the robbers 
wore masks.77  The FBI obtained several photographs which por-
trayed all three defendants.78  The photos were shown to five bank 
employees who witnessed the robbery.79  All five employees identi-
fied Simmons as one of the robbers.80  About a week later, three of 
the employees identified another defendant, Garrett, as the second 





72 Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302. 
73 390 U.S. 377 (1968). 
74 Id. at 384. 
75 Id. at 383. 
76 Id. at 380. 
77 Id. at 385. 
78 Simmons, 390 U.S. at 385. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 380. 
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view of the second robber.81 
At trial, all five witnesses identified Simmons as one of the 
robbers, and three identified Garrett as the other robber.82  All three 
defendants were convicted.83  On appeal, the defendant that was not 
identified by any of the witnesses had his conviction reversed, while 
the convictions of Simmons and Garrett were affirmed.84  Certiorari 
was granted as to Simmons and Garrett.85  Simmons argued that his 
pretrial photograph identification “was so unduly prejudicial as fatal-
ly to taint his conviction.”86  Garrett argued his constitutional rights 
were violated for an unrelated reason, and his conviction was re-
versed.87 
The Court reasoned that the pretrial photographic identifica-
tion was not unnecessarily suggestive because there was little chance 
that the procedure led to the misidentification of Simmons under the 
totality of the circumstances.88  The Court held that the witnesses 
were able to make a positive identification of Simmons because the 
robbery occurred in broad daylight and the robbers wore no masks so 
the witnesses viewed the robbers’ faces for an extended period of 
time.89  The Court also held that nothing about the procedure could 
have led to the misidentification of Simmons as one of the robbers 
because the FBI displayed photos containing Simmons among several 
other people, each witness viewed the photos alone, and there was no 
evidence to demonstrate that the FBI said anything to the witnesses to 
suggest the photos contained suspects in the robbery.90  The Court 
went on to explain that all five witnesses positively identified Sim-
mons in the photos, and the identifications were confirmed at trial by 
all the witnesses who did not display any doubts that Simmons was 
 
81 Id. at 380-81. 
82 Id. at 381. 
83 Simmons, 390 U.S. at 381. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 381. 
86 Id. at 383. 
87 Id. at 390-91.  The Court reversed Garret’s conviction because his Fourth Amendment 
rights were violated when the trial court allowed Garret’s testimony from a pretrial motion to 
suppress the suitcase and contents to prove his guilt.  Simmons, 390 U.S. at 390-91. 
88 Id. at 385. 
89 Id. at 385. 
90 Id. 
9
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the robber.91  The Court affirmed Simmons’ conviction because there 
was no cause to doubt that the identification of Simmons was correct 
under the totality of the circumstances.92 
The Court applied the totality test for in-court identifications 
from Stovall to consider the reliability of evidence derived from sug-
gestive pretrial procedures in Neil v. Biggers.93  In Neil, the Supreme 
Court outlined specific factors to determine the issue of whether a 
pretrial identification that may have been unduly suggestive could be 
admitted as evidence at trial.94  Neil involved an abduction and rape 
of a woman.95  The woman was attacked in her kitchen at knifepoint, 
and then she was taken to a desolate location near her home and 
raped.96  The victim claimed that she was able to see the perpetrator 
inside her home even though the lights were off in the kitchen be-
cause of the light shining through from the bedroom.97  She also stat-
ed that she got a good look at him during the rape because it was a 
full moon, and the entire ordeal lasted half an hour.98  The victim 
provided a thorough description of the perpetrator including his age, 
height, weight, build, facial complexion, and voice.99  The police 
showed the victim thirty to forty pictures over a seven-month period, 
but she never identified her attacker.100 
Police eventually arrested the defendant for a subsequent at-
tack, and they brought in the former victim to potentially identify him 
as her attacker.101  The police attempted to perform a line-up, but they 
were unable to find people resembling the defendant.102  Instead, they 
performed a show-up where the victim walked by the defendant, and 
the police had the defendant say the words used during the attack.103  
 
91 Id. 
92 Simmons, 390 U.S. at 385. 
93 409 U.S. 188 (1972). 
94 Id. at 199-200. 
95 Id. at 193. 
96 Id. at 193-94. 
97 Id. at 194. 
98 Neil, 409 U.S. at 194. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 194-95. 
101 Id. at 195. 
102 Id. 
103 Neil, 409 U.S. at 195. 
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The victim in the present case identified the defendant as her attacker, 
and she later testified that she could never have forgotten his face.104 
At trial the defendant was convicted of rape, and he sought 
habeas corpus relief.105  The district court held that the show-up was 
unduly suggestive in violation of the defendant’s due process rights, 
and the court reversed the guilty verdict.106  The district court relied 
on the fact that police did not make a better effort to perform a line-
up, and the show-up itself was unduly suggestive requiring a reversal 
of the verdict.107 
The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court’s decision, 
holding that even though the show-up was unduly suggestive, the 
identification was reliable under the totality of the circumstances.108  
The Court explained that a show-up is not in itself a violation of due 
process, demonstrated by the hospital room show-up in Stovall.109  
The Court held that admission of the pretrial identification turns on 
several factors to determine whether it is reliable:110 
[T]he factors to be considered in evaluating the likeli-
hood of misidentification include the opportunity of 
the witness to view the criminal at the time of the 
crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of 
the witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level 
of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the con-
frontation, and the length of time between the crime 
and the confrontation.111 
The Court held that in applying these factors to the case at 
hand, the pretrial identification was reliable and admissible:112 the 
victim viewed the defendant for a half hour under adequate lighting 
in her home and outside under the light of a full moon;113 the victim’s 
 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 196. 
106 Id. at 200. 
107 Id. 
108 Neil, 409 U.S. at 200. 
109 Id. at 200-01. 
110 Id. at 199-200. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 200. 
113 Neil, 409 U.S. at 200-01. 
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attention was only on the defendant as this was an intimate and seri-
ous crime;114 and the victim provided an accurate description of her 
attacker after the crime, and the victim testified that there was no 
doubt as to the identity of her attacker.115  The Court dismissed the 
seven-month period between the crime and identification because the 
victim was shown at least thirty photos of potential attackers, but she 
never identified anybody before she identified the defendant.116  The 
Court held that the victim’s identification contained no substantial 
likelihood of misidentification, and the evidence was properly al-
lowed to go to the jury.117 
In Manson v. Brathwaite,118 the Supreme Court applied the 
factors used in Neil to pretrial photographic identifications as well.119  
Brathwaite involved an undercover narcotics sting in which an of-
ficer purchased heroin from a seller in a well-lit hallway outside the 
seller’s apartment.120  The undercover officer described the seller to 
another officer moments later as a “colored man, approximately five 
feet eleven inches tall, dark complexion, black hair, short Afro style, 
and having high cheekbones, and of a heavy build.”121  The other of-
ficer believed he knew the seller as the defendant in this case, and he 
left a picture of the defendant on the desk of the undercover of-
ficer.122  The undercover officer confirmed that the defendant was the 
seller, and the defendant was later arrested and convicted of posses-
sion and sale of heroin.123 
The undercover officer testified at trial that there was no 
doubt that the picture was of the defendant, and he made a positive 
in-court identification of the defendant as the seller.124  The defendant 





117 Id. at 200-01. 
118 432 U.S. 98 (1977). 
119 Id. at 114. 
120 Id. at 99-100. 
121 Id. at 101. 
122 Id. 
123 Manson, 432 U.S. at 101-02. 
124 Id. at 102. 
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tion.125  The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the pretrial iden-
tification by photo should have been excluded from evidence because 
the use of a single photo is unduly suggestive regardless of reliabil-
ity.126 
The Court reversed the lower courts’ decisions because, under 
the totality of the circumstances, the officer’s positive identification 
of the photo of the defendant as the seller was reliable and therefore 
admissible regardless of suggestiveness.127  The Court specifically re-
jected the per se approach utilized by the lower court that would ex-
clude an unduly suggestive pretrial identification without regard to 
reliability.128  The Court held that the factors set forth in Neil also ap-
ply to pretrial identifications by photograph.129  The Court explained 
that the use of a single photograph was unduly suggestive, but upon 
application of the factors comprising the totality of the circumstances, 
the officer’s identification of the defendant did not possess a “sub-
stantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”130  The Court 
held the identification by a single photo to be reliable because: the 
witness was a trained police officer; he had sufficient opportunity to 
view the seller in a well-lit hallway; he accurately described the sell-
er; he positively identified the defendant’s photo as the seller two 
days after the crime; and he positively identified the defendant in 
court with confidence upon cross-examination.131  The Court made it 
clear in this holding that a reliable identification trumps an unduly 
suggestive pretrial identification procedure utilizing a single photo.132 
After expressly applying the totality of the circumstances test 
to pretrial photo identifications, the Court finally addressed sugges-
tive practices attributed solely to civilians.  In Perry v. New Hamp-
shire,133 the Court addressed the issue of whether an inquiry into the 
reliability of a witness’ pretrial identification is required when the al-
 
125 Id. at 103. 
126 Id. at 103-04. 
127 Id. at 117. 
128 Manson, 432 U.S. at 113. 
129 Id. at 114. 
130 Id. at 116. 
131 Id. at 114-16. 
132 Id. at 111-13. 
133 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012). 
13
Gordon: Suggestive Pretrial Identification
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013
1318 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
 
legedly suggestive procedure is not arranged by law enforcement.134  
Previous Circuit Court of Appeals cases held that an inquiry into the 
reliability is required even when the suggestive circumstances are ar-
ranged by civilians.135  In Perry, the Court expressly abrogated these 
previous Circuit Court of Appeals cases when the Court held that the 
Due Process Clause does not require an inquiry into the reliability of 
the pretrial identification when the suggestive circumstances were 
created by civilians.136 
In Perry, New Hampshire police were called because Nubia 
Blandon saw a man attempting to break into various cars on her 
block.137  When the police were interviewing Blandon, the officer 
asked her to describe the man she saw.138  In response, Blandon 
pointed out her window and said the man she saw breaking into cars 
was standing in the parking lot next to another police officer.139  The 
defendant was arrested following this identification.140  At trial, the 
defendant moved to suppress the identification on the grounds that it 
was unduly suggestive.141  The court denied the motion because it 
found that the police did not create the allegedly suggestive circum-
stances.142  The defendant was convicted, and he appealed all the way 
up to the Supreme Court.143 
The defendant argued that reliability is paramount to the ad-
missibility of a suggestive pretrial identification procedure, and it 
does not matter whether the police or a civilian created the suggestive 
circumstances.144  The Court expressly rejected this argument be-
cause the due process check for reliability is designed to deter im-
proper police identification procedures.145  The Court held that the of-
 
134 Id. at 720-21. 
135 See, e.g., Bouthot v. U.S., 878 F.2d 1506 (1st Cir. 1989); Dunnigan v. Keane, 137 F.3d 
117 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that suggestiveness attributed to civilians violates the defend-
ant’s due process rights). 
136 Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 730. 
137 Id. at 721. 
138 Id. at 722. 
139 Id. 
140 Id.  
141 Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 722. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 722-23. 
144 Id. at 725. 
145 Id. 
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ficer did nothing to create a suggestive circumstance, and there is no 
requirement under the Due Process Clause to check for reliability 
when the suggestive circumstance is not attributable to law enforce-
ment.146 
IV. THE STATE APPROACH 
Under the New York State Constitution, the New York Court 
of Appeals interpreted the Due Process Clause to require a per se ap-
proach to the admissibility of pretrial identifications by photographic 
array, which is in direct conflict with the Supreme Court’s interpreta-
tion of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.  In 
People v. Adams,147 the Court of Appeals held that any unduly sug-
gestive pretrial identification procedure requires the exclusion of that 
pretrial identification from evidence regardless of reliability.148  
However, the court held that the impermissibly suggestive pretrial 
identification procedure did not warrant reversal because there were 
two other witnesses who were not present at the suggestive pretrial 
identification, and the tainted witnesses had an independent basis for 
their in court identification.149 
Adams involved a robbery of a stationery store by three 
men.150  The men entered the store and announced a robbery to three 
witnesses who worked in the store.151  The men took forty-two dollars 
from the cash register and then proceeded to flee on foot while being 
chased by two witnesses.152  A security guard and police officer wit-
nessed the chase and joined in.153  The security guard apprehended 
one man with the money and a gun while the other two men es-
caped.154  The man who was arrested provided information that led to 
the arrest of the other two men, Gatson and Adams.155  That evening, 
 
146 Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 726.  
147 423 N.E.2d 379, 383-84 (N.Y. 1981). 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 384. 
150 Id. at 380. 
151 Id. 
152 Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 380. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 381. 
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the three witnesses were called to the station house to identify the 
three suspects.156  The witnesses were told by an officer that they had 
the suspects in custody.157  The three suspects were shown together to 
the three witnesses at the same time.158  They were sure the three men 
were the robbers.159 
The man arrested at the scene pled guilty, and the other two 
were later convicted at trial.160  At trial, defense moved to suppress 
the pretrial identification and subsequent in-court identification on 
the basis that the procedure was unduly suggestive when the officer 
stated to the eyewitnesses that they had the suspects in custody.161 
The court denied the motion because it found that even if the pretrial 
identification was unduly suggestive, the witnesses had an independ-
ent basis for an in-court identification.162  The security guard and the 
officer at the scene also identified Adams as one of the robbers at tri-
al.163  The defendant appealed, but the Appellate Division affirmed 
the conviction.164  Adams appealed to the Court of Appeals.165 
The Court of Appeals held that the evidence of the pretrial 
identification at the station house was unduly suggestive and should 
not have been admitted at trial.166  This case established a per se rule 
of exclusion of any identification evidence produced by a suggestive 
pretrial identification procedure.167  The court reasoned that the pre-
trial identification at the station was unduly suggestive because an of-
ficer told the victims that they had the suspects in custody and all vic-
tims viewed all three robbers at the same time.168  However, the court 
also held that in-court identifications are still admissible when there 
is an independent source of the identification.169  The court held that 
 
156 Id. 









166 Id. at 382-83. 
167 Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 382-83. 
168 Id. at 382. 
169 Id. at 384. 
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the exclusion of the pretrial identification would not require reversal 
of the conviction because of the in-court identifications by the securi-
ty guard and officer who were not present at the station house show-
up.170  The Court of Appeals was also persuaded by the trial court’s 
express finding of an independent source of the in-court identifica-
tions by the three victims who viewed the robbers’ faces throughout 
the robbery.171 
After holding that pretrial identification evidence derived 
from a suggestive procedure is per se inadmissible, the Court of Ap-
peals outlined the procedure to address a defendant’s challenge that 
an identification procedure was suggestive in People v. Chipp.172  
When a pretrial identification procedure is challenged, the People 
have the “initial burden of going forward to establish the reasonable-
ness of the police conduct and the lack of any undue suggestive-
ness.”173  Once the People meet this burden, the defendant must go on 
to prove that the identification procedure was unduly suggestive.174  
A procedure is deemed suggestive if there is a “substantial likelihood 
that the defendant would be singled out for identification.”175  If sug-
gestiveness is shown, the evidence derived from the pretrial identifi-
cation is inadmissible, and the People must go on to show by clear 
and convincing evidence that the witness had an independent source 
for the in-court identification.176 
In Chipp, the defendant argued that he had satisfied his bur-
den of demonstrating that the identification procedure was suggestive 
because he was the only person in a line-up with a complexion simi-
lar to the one described by the witness.177  However, the court held 
that the difference in skin tone of the men in the line-up does not suf-
ficiently demonstrate that the procedure was unduly suggestive.178  
Therefore, the defendant did not meet his burden of showing that the 




172 552 N.E.2d 608 (N.Y. 1990). 




177 Chipp, 552 N.E.2d at 613. 
178 Id. 
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fendant would be singled out for identification.”179 
Once the court firmly established that evidence derived from 
suggestive pretrial identification procedures arranged by law en-
forcement is per se inadmissible, the court addressed the issue of 
when the suggestive aspect of the procedure is created by a civilian in 
People v. Marte.180  In Marte, a minor referred to as Peter L. was 
robbed and shot in the chest on the block where he lived.181  After 
looking through hundreds of photos, Peter was unable to identify his 
attacker.182  After giving up on identifying the shooter, Peter’s sister 
Margaret found out that the defendant was the shooter when the de-
fendant told Margaret that he had recently shot somebody on her 
block.183  Margaret showed Peter a picture of the defendant, and after 
encouragement from his sister, Peter went to the police and named 
the defendant as his attacker.184  Peter proceeded to pick the defend-
ant out from a line-up.185  The defendant was convicted, and on ap-
peal the Court of Appeals affirmed.186 
The court held that the rule of exclusion regarding suggestive 
pretrial identifications does not apply when suggestiveness is created 
by a civilian.187  The court found that the police were not aware of 
Margaret’s involvement in the identification at the time.188  The court 
reasoned that the rule excluding evidence derived from a suggestive 
pretrial identification should not be extended to include suggestive 
practices by civilians because the rule is in place to prevent mistaken 
identifications caused by faulty police procedures.189  The court held 
that the purpose of the rule is to affect police procedures, and the 
family and friends of a victim are not likely to change their behavior 
based on rules of law.190 
 
179 Id. 
180 Marte, 912 N.E.2d 37. 
181 Id. at 38. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Id.  
185 Marte, 912 N.E.2d at 38. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 41. 
189 Id. at 39. 
190 Marte, 912 N.E.2d at 39. 
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After the court held that suggestive practices attributed to ci-
vilians does not violate due process, the court in People v. McBride191 
demonstrated the standard of review applicable in cases where there 
is a challenge to the admissibility of pretrial identification.  In 
McBride, the victim described his attacker as a man wearing a grey 
jacket among other articles of clothing.192  At the lineup, the defend-
ant was wearing a grey jacket, but he was not wearing any of the oth-
er specific articles of clothing described by the victim.  The victim 
chose the defendant, and he was convicted.193  On appeal, the defend-
ant argued that there was a substantial likelihood of misidentification 
because he was the only person wearing a grey jacket.194 
The court held that there was sufficient record support for the 
lower court’s determination that the pretrial identification was not 
unduly suggestive because the grey jacket was not unusual, and all 
the other factors including race, height, and age were constant among 
the individuals in the lineup.195  The mere coincidence that the de-
fendant was wearing an article of clothing similar to the type de-
scribed by the victim does not render the pretrial identification sug-
gestive when that article of clothing is not distinctive in any way.196 
The court in Delamota cited People v. Wilson197 in support of 
its determination that the new trial be preceded by a hearing to allow 
the People to show by clear and convincing evidence that there was 
an independent basis for Hernandez’s in-court identification.198  Wil-
son also supports the proposition that the trial court should go 
through the full analysis when a pretrial identification procedure is 
challenged so the appellate courts have all the facts necessary to 
make a proper determination.199 
In Wilson, the trial court held that the pretrial identification 
was not suggestive where the witness was shown a photo of the de-
 
191 928 N.E.2d 1027. 
192 Id. at 1032. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 1033. 
196 McBride, 928 N.E.2d at 1033. 
197 835 N.E.2d 1220 (N.Y. 2005). 
198 Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 391. 
199 Wilson, 835 N.E.2d at 1221. 
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fendant immediately preceding the lineup.200  However, the trial court 
did not proceed to determine if there was an independent source for 
the witness’ in-court identification.201  The Court of Appeals subse-
quently held that the pretrial identification was suggestive, and it or-
dered a new trial to be preceded by a hearing to determine if there 
was an independent basis for the witness’ in-court identification.202  
The court noted that the trial courts should always determine if there 
is an independent source for the witness’ in-court identification, even 
if they find that the pretrial identification procedure was not sugges-
tive.203 
After the court in Delamota addressed the need for lower 
courts to address the independent source requirement even when it 
did not find the procedure to be suggestive, the court also cited Peo-
ple v. Young204 to demonstrate the independent basis requirement for 
the admissibility of an in-court identification.205  In Young, the trial 
court found the pretrial identification to be unduly suggestive and in-
admissible.206  The trial court subsequently held that the victim had 
an independent basis for the in-court identification because the victim 
testified that although the defendant’s face was covered with a mask, 
she retained a mental image of the defendant’s eyes from the crime 
that lasted approximately five to seven minutes.207  On appeal, the 
Court of Appeals refused to disturb this finding of fact.208  The find-
ing was held to meet the clear and convincing requirement to show 






204 859 N.E.2d 623 (N.Y. 2006). 
205 Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 391. 
206 Young, 859 N.E.2d at 625. 
207 Id. at 624-25. 
208 Id. at 625. 
209 Id.  See also People v. Hall, 870 N.Y.S.2d 508, 511 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2008) (hold-
ing that the witness had an independent source for the identification because the witness had 
a face-to-face conversation with the defendant for several minutes, and the witness gave an 
accurate description of the defendant shortly after the crime occurred). 
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V. DOES THE NEW YORK APPROACH RESULT IN MORE 
RELIABLE CONVICTIONS? 
The majority in People v. Adams established the per se rule of 
exclusion of identification evidence derived from suggestive pretrial 
identification procedures.210  The very same rule was contemplated 
by the Court in Manson v. Brathwaite, but was rejected in favor of a 
less rigid totality of the circumstances approach.211  In Manson, the 
Court found the per se approach to prevent reliable and relevant iden-
tification evidence from reaching the jury while serving the same de-
terrent effect as the totality rule.212  The majority in Adams expressly 
rejected the Court’s reasoning in Brathwaite because it felt that the 
admission of pretrial identifications derived from suggestive proce-
dures would increase the number of wrongful convictions.213  The 
concurrence in Adams disagreed with the majority’s adoption of the 
per se rule of exclusion, stating the rule “lacks legal, logical[,] and 
analytical validity.”214 
On its face, a per se rule of exclusion reduces the risk of 
wrongful convictions.  The strongest argument in favor of a per se 
rule is the deterrent effect.  An absolute rule excluding identification 
evidence derived from suggestive procedures ensures that law en-
forcement will take the necessary precautions to conduct pretrial 
identifications in a proper manner.215  As with other exclusionary 
rules, the main purpose is to affect the procedures and practices of 
 
210 Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 383-84. 
211 Manson, 432 U.S. 111-13.  The Court laid out three factors that a proper rule should 
address.  Those factors are the problem of unreliable eyewitness identification, the deterrent 
effect, and the proper administration of justice.  Id.  The Court held that the per se approach 
is too extreme a solution to protect these interests.  Id. 
212 Id. 
213 Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 384 (“However, if the jury finds the in-court identification not 
entirely convincing it should not be permitted to resolve its doubts by relying on the fact that 
the witness had identified the defendant on a prior occasion if that identification was made 
under inherently suggestive circumstances.  Similarly, if the witness is unable to identify the 
defendant at trial the defendant’s conviction should not rest solely upon evidence of a pretri-
al identification made under circumstances which were likely to produce an unreliable re-
sult.”). 
214 Id. (Cooke, J., concurring) (arguing that the totality rule adopted by the Court in Man-
son sufficiently addresses the due process concerns inherent with suggestive pretrial identifi-
cation procedures). 
215 Manson, 432 U.S. at 125 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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law enforcement.216  A totality approach in this circumstance does not 
give law enforcement the necessary encouragement to alter their pro-
cedures because of the extreme flexibility of the rule.217  Under the 
totality approach, even the most suggestive procedures may result in 
admission of the pretrial identification evidence.218  Deterrence is a 
key aspect in prevention of wrongful convictions.219 
However, the per se rule of exclusion adopted by the New 
York Court of Appeals does not serve the purpose of limiting wrong-
ful convictions when in-court identifications are permissible under 
the lenient independent source rule.220  Under the federal approach, as 
laid down in Simmons, an in-court identification following a sugges-
tive pretrial procedure is subjected to a more rigorous standard to de-
termine whether the suggestive procedure produced “a very substan-
tial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”221 
The risk of a wrongful conviction in a case where the pretrial 
identification was gained under a suggestive procedure is increased 
under the New York independent source rule.222  In Delamota, the 
court held that the validity of the conviction rested on whether the 
People could show that there was an independent source for the wit-
ness’ in-court identification.223  The standard for evaluating whether a 
witness has a source independent of the suggestive procedure to iden-
tify the defendant in court has deteriorated in New York.  The stand-
ard used in Delamota, the clear and convincing evidence requirement 
demonstrated by Young, is very lenient because the witness was only 
able to see the criminal’s eyes for five to seven minutes.224  This 





219 Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 383. 
220 See Young, 859 N.E.2d at 624-25 (holding that a mental image of the defendant’s eyes 
will satisfy the independent source requirement). 
221 Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384.  See also Neil, 409 U.S. at 199-200 (applying the same 
standard for determining whether in-court identifications are reliable to determine whether 
pretrial identifications are admissible). 
222 See Young, 859 N.E.2d at 624-25 (holding that a mental image of the defendant’s eyes 
will satisfy the independent source requirement). 
223 Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 391. 
224 Young, 859 N.E.2d at 624-25. 
225 Simmons, 390 U.S. at 385. 
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As in Young, the victim in Delamota may easily provide an 
independent basis for his in-court identification because he claimed 
to have recognized his attacker before the suggestive procedure oc-
curred.  The People may argue that the victim had an independent ba-
sis for his in-court identification because the victim told a therapist 
that he had previously seen his attacker in the apartment complex.226  
This conversation with the therapist occurred before the suggestive 
identification procedure occurred.227  The court may find this conver-
sation to be clear and convincing evidence of an independent source 
when judged against the standard from Young. 
Under the federal approach, the standard for evaluating 
whether an in-court identification following a suggestive pretrial pro-
cedure is from an independent source has been interpreted to be iden-
tical to the standard for determining whether identification evidence 
derived from suggestive pretrial procedures is admissible.228  The fac-
tors considered by the Court in Neil to determine the admissibility of 
suggestive pretrial identification evidence guides our analysis of 
whether an in-court identification is permissible following a sugges-
tive pretrial procedure.229  In applying these factors to Delamota, it 
can be determined whether the federal approach affords more protec-
tion from wrongful convictions. 
The first factor the Court considers in the evaluation of in-
court identifications following a suggestive pretrial procedure is the 
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime.230  In 
Delamota, the People might argue that the victim had sufficient op-
portunity to view the criminal because Hernandez was face to face 
with the defendant during the robbery that occurred in an elevator.231  
Furthermore, Hernandez told his therapist that he recognized the man 
who robbed him from a previous encounter in his apartment com-
plex.232  The defendant might argue that Hernandez did not have suf-
ficient opportunity to view the criminal at the time because the rob-
 
226 Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 386. 
227 Id. 
228 Manson, 432 U.S. at 123-24 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
229 Id. 
230 Id. at 114. 
231 Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 385. 
232 Id. at 386. 
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bery could not have lasted more than a couple minutes.233 
The second factor considered by the Court is the witness’ de-
gree of attention at the time of the crime.234  The People might next 
argue that Hernandez exhibited a great deal of attention because the 
robbery occurred in such a small space.235  It may be further argued 
that Hernandez was the target of the attack, and as the victim, he had 
a personal stake in observing the man who perpetrated the crime.236  
The defendant might counter that Hernandez did not exhibit the ap-
propriate degree of attention because victims often do not concentrate 
on the face of his or her attacker. 
The next factor considered by the Court is the accuracy of the 
description given by the witness.237  The People’s argument is weak 
because Hernandez’s first description of his attacker was very inaccu-
rate.238  His description was only accurate in that he labeled his at-
tacker as a Hispanic male, but the age and height were inaccurate.239  
The defendant might argue that Hernandez’s initial description was 
inaccurate because Hernandez stated that his attacker used both arms 
during the robbery while this was impossible for the defendant due to 
a bullet wound.240  The People might then argue that Hernandez never 
said that the robber used both of his arms, and the detective’s recol-
lection of Hernandez’s description was inaccurate when he testified 
at trial.241 
The fourth factor is the witness’ degree of certainty when tes-
tifying at trial.242  The People might argue that Hernandez was certain 
about the identity of his attacker at trial when he gave various expla-
nations for the discrepancies in his description to rebut the assertion 
that he was mistaken about the identity of his attacker.243  The de-
fendant might then argue that Hernandez could not have been certain 
 
233 Id. at 385. 
234 Manson, 432 U.S. at 115. 
235 Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 385. 
236 Id. 
237 Manson, 432 U.S. at 115. 




242 Manson, 432 U.S. at 115. 
243 Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 386. 
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about the identity of his attacker because of the various discrepancies 
in the description of his attacker.244  Hernandez’s explanations should 
not amount to certainty after the defendant was already deemed guilty 
by the civilian interpreter.245 
The final factor considered by the Court under the totality ap-
proach is the time between the confrontation and the crime.246  The 
People might likely argue that no significant amount of time passed 
between the crime and confrontation because it only occurred a few 
days after the robbery.247  The defendant does not have a valid argu-
ment considering that a few days cannot be considered a significant 
amount of time. 
Under the totality of the circumstances, the Court may find 
that the discrepancies between Hernandez’s initial description and the 
defendant render his in-court identification unreliable when judged 
against the corrupting effect of the procedure utilized.  The procedure 
in this case was very corruptive because the civilian interpreter used 
by law enforcement may have influenced the victim’s identification 
when the interpreter thought the defendant was responsible before the 
identification occurred.  The fact that Hernandez told his therapist 
that he recognized the man who attacked him has no weight because 
Hernandez’s initial description was completely inaccurate.  If he rec-
ognized his attacker, then his description should have been more ac-
curate. 
Based on the above analysis, with the limited facts available 
to the court in Delamota, the federal independent source rule seems 
to be more protective against wrongful convictions.  The federal to-
tality test used to determine whether an in-court identification follow-
ing a suggestive pretrial identification procedure uses all available 
facts to determine the issue in a concrete fashion.  The standard used 
in New York seems to have deteriorated over time based on the deci-
sion in Young.  The New York independent source standard requires 
careful consideration by the courts to determine if this is the best rule 
for guarding against wrongful convictions. 
 
244 Id. at 385. 
245 Id. 
246 Manson, 432 U.S. at 115-16. 
247 Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 385. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The two approaches laid out in this Note are only applicable 
to suggestiveness resulting from identification procedures employed 
by law enforcement.248  This was a central issue in Delamota.249  The 
court could have decided this issue either way because the extent of 
Juan Jr.’s familiarity with the defendant was unknown by anyone, in-
cluding the detective, until Juan Jr.’s testimony at trial.250  However, 
the detective should not have trusted a civilian with the important 
task of interpreting an interview with a police officer.251  The court 
made an example of the detective by condemning this practice when 
it held that the procedure was unduly suggestive.252  The court made 
the right choice because this decision will inform law enforcement of 
the importance associated with proper pretrial identification proce-
dures and convictions at trial. 
Under the Federal and New York approaches, the concern re-
garding suggestive pretrial identifications is focused on the general 
reliability of the witness’ identification.  The procedures employed by 
the police are the secondary concern because both approaches allow 
for an identification in some form or another regardless of the sug-
gestiveness of the procedure employed by law enforcement.253  This 
is a major concern for the due process rights of defendants because 
law enforcement can employ a wide range of suggestive procedures 
 
248 Compare Marte, 912 N.E.2d at 39 (holding that suggestiveness attributed solely to a 
civilian does not violate a defendant’s due process rights under the New York State Constitu-
tion), with Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 730 (holding that suggestiveness created by civilians does not 
require a reliability analysis). 
249 Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 391. 
250 Id. at 386. 
251 Id. at 391 (holding that there was no record support for the lower court’s finding that 
the photo array was not unduly suggestive because the lower court knew that Juan Jr. was 
familiar with the defendant, Detective Koch had reason to believe that Juan Jr. was familiar 
with the defendant, the Detective acted on unspecified neighborhood gossip, there was no 
reason for the Detective to use Juan Jr. as an interpreter instead of an impartial translator, 
and the Detective could not be reasonably sure that Juan Jr. would accurately translate the 
conversation). 
252 Id. 
253 Compare Chipp, 552 N.E.2d at 613 (holding that an in-court identification may be 
made when there is a basis for the witness’ identification independent of the suggestive pro-
cedure), with Manson, 432 U.S. at 117 (holding that under the totality of the circumstances 
the officer’s positive identification of the photo of the defendant as the seller was reliable 
and therefore admissible regardless of suggestiveness). 
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that may result in misidentifications.  A witness’ memory is a fragile 
resource that may seem reliable even when it is generally accepted 
that witness testimony is almost always suspect.  Convictions based 
on witness identifications and testimony should be closely regulated 
by the courts, and further protection should be afforded to defendants 
in the form of stricter rules of suppression when pretrial identifica-
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